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Balancing Sovereignty and Party Autonomy in
Private International Law: Regression at the
European Court of Justice
Ronald A. Brand
Abstract
The traditional function of private international law is to determine jurisdiction,
applicable law, and the extent to which foreign judgments will be recognized and
enforced. This naturally requires reliance on domestic law rules. More recently,
however, regional governmental bodies, multilateral organizations, and even non-
governmental organizations are creating rules applicable to transnational trans-
actions. Along with this trend has come greater respect for party autonomy in
selecting of the rules that govern private relationships. These trends have impli-
cations for both private transaction planning and for the regulatory function of
the state. Granting private parties greater rights to determine the contours and
results of their relationships necessarily reduces the control of the state in private
affairs. This paper discusses traditional notions of “sovereignty” and how those
notions relate to allocations of authority for the rules governing private party re-
lationships. After a general discussion of sovereignty and the evolution of private
international law, consideration is given to three decisions of the European Court
of Justice that demonstrate an approach to issues of party autonomy that rewards
conduct arguably inconsistent with a quest for predictable and stable private party
relationships. The paper concludes that these decisions represent a retrenchment
into potentially questionable understandings of concepts of sovereignty, and risk
the curtailment of otherwise positive developments in the balance of state author-
ity and respect for party autonomy.
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1A prime example of such a regional legal instrument is the Brussels I Regulation, which
in 2002 replaced the Brussels Convention in the European Community.  Council Regulation
44/2001/EC of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. EURO. COMM. L12/1 [hereinafter
“Brussels I Regulation”].
2See, e.g., the project on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters at the Hague Conference on Private International Law, which
began in 1992.  Ronald A. Brand, The 1999 Hague Preliminary Draft Convention Text on
Jurisdiction and Judgments:  A View From the United States, XL RIVISTA DI DIRITTO
INTERNATIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUAL 31 (2004).  That project became a more limited
Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, concluded at a Diplomatic Conference in
June 2005.  For information on the project, see the Hague Conference website at:
http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=progress.listing&cat=4.  The most successful effort at
creating rules on jurisdiction and the recognition of decisions has not come in the context of
litigation, but rather in arbitration, with the New York Arbitration Convention.  United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter “New York
Convention”].
Balancing Sovereignty and Party Autonomy
in Private International Law:
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I. Introduction
The traditional function of private international law has been to lead us to the appropriate
national legal system for determining rights and for the settlement of disputes.  More-and-more,
however, regional governmental bodies,1 multilateral organizations,2 and even non-governmental
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3The prototypical examples of a non-governmental organization creating rules that govern
private party transactions are the Incoterms and the Uniform Customs and Practice of the
International Chamber of Commerce.  International Chamber of Commerce, INCOTERMS 2000,
(I.C.C. Publication 560); International Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice
for Documentary Credits (ICC Publication 500).  The importance of these rules is reflected in
former Section 5-102(4) of the New York version of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
specifically acknowledged the UCP by stating that New York’s U.C.C. Article 5 “does not apply
to a letter of credit . . . if by its terms . . . such letter of credit . . . is subject . . . to the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits.”  N.Y.U.C.C. 5-102(4) (McKinney)
(1964).  That provision was removed with the New York adoption of new amendments to Article
5 in 2000, but the Official Comment to Section 5-101 now states that “Article 5 is consistent
with ans was influenced by the rules in the existing version of the UCP.”  U.C.C. § 5-101,
Official Comment (1995 revisions).
4Examples include Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation, providing that the Member
State court chosen by the parties “shall have jurisdiction,” and that “[s]uch jurisdiction shall be
exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise,”  and Article 3(1) of the Rome Convention,
stating simply that “[a] contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.”  Brussels I
Regulation, supra note 1, art. 23; 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual
obligations, art. 3(1) (consolidated version), O.J. Eur. Comm. C 27/34 (1998) [hereinafter “Rome
Convention”].  The original version is found at 23 O.J. Eur. Comm. L 266/1 (1980).
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organizations3 are creating rules applicable to transnational transactions.  This harmonization and
coordination of private law rules through treaties, internal legislation of regional institutions, and
trade group rules has also accelerated the trend toward respect for party autonomy in the selection
of rules to govern private relationships.4  Through this process, what some would call the
“sovereign” function of law-making is being delegated to international organizations, regional
institutions, non-governmental organizations, and private parties.
This trend has implications for both private transaction planning and for the regulatory
function of the state.  Granting private parties greater rights to determine the contours and results
of their relationships necessarily reduces the control of the state in private affairs.  If the ability to
regulate private transactions is an important element of state authority, then the transfer of that
authority, both to private parties and to other institutions, represents an important development in
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art25
5See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Comparative Law for the International Age, 75 TUL. L.
REV. 1103, 1108 (2001) (finding the process of harmonization and cooperation to result in the
"curtailment of sovereignty.").
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the evolution of sovereign state legal regimes.  In the long run, this new lex mercatoria process
may represent a form of globalization every bit as significant as the creation of new multilateral
organizations and courts.
All of this raises questions about traditional notions of what we call “sovereignty” and
how those notions relate to allocations of authority for the rules governing private party
relationships.  It is one thing, as is done in the traditional private international law process, to
seek structure in the manner in which we determine which state’s rules govern a particular
relationship.  It is quite another to adjust the role of the state through cooperation in multilateral
bodies and in the delegation to private parties of the role of rule creators.  This combined
reallocation of authority to both non-state institutions and private parties justifies assessment of
concepts of sovereignty and of the role of the state in private party relationships.  This ultimately
leads to consideration of whether granting increased legislative functions to international
organizations (both governmental and non-governmental) and to private parties (in the name of
party autonomy) is–as some would argue–a step that weakens the sovereign state,5 or a proper
exercise of sovereign power.
In this chapter I begin with a brief history of the notion of sovereignty, stressing the roots
of a concept that developed first to explain internal relationships within a state between the
governor and the governed, but which is now routinely applied to relationships between and
among states.  I then turn to the evolution of private international law during the latter half of the
twentieth century and the increased role played by both multilateral institutions and private
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
6See, e.g., JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS 2 (1998) (“Sovereignty
denotes independence.  A sovereign state is one that acknowledges no superior power over its
own government.”).
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parties in choosing the law applicable to private transactions and the appropriate forum for the
resolution of private disputes.
The jurisdictional subpart of private international law, in particular, raises important
questions regarding the role of the state in opportunities for parallel litigation.  This role is
highlighted by three recent decisions of the European Court of Justice demonstrating an approach
to issues of party autonomy that rewards conduct arguably inconsistent with a quest for
predictable and stable private party relationships.  Because these decisions also represent a type
of retrenchment into potentially questionable understandings of concepts of sovereignty, they
provide an opportunity to consider application of the thoughts otherwise developed in this
chapter.  Ultimately, I conclude that this judicial trend in the European Community risks the
curtailment of otherwise positive developments in the balance of state authority, the restriction of
the appropriate development of international rules applicable to private party relationships, and
the imposition of limitations on the proper role of party autonomy in the evolution of private
international law.  It thus ultimately risks creating imbalance in the relationship between
sovereign authority and proper respect for party autonomy.
II. Understanding Sovereignty
The term “sovereignty” in the international legal regime has caused no end of problems. 
While some have seen it as the important term in defining the independent state,6 others have
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art25
7See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Notes from the President, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. NEWSL. (ASIL,
Washington, D.C.), March 1993, at 1 (“Away with the “S” word!”); Jacques Maritain, The
Concept of Sovereignty, 44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343 (1950) (“political philosophy must eliminate
Sovereignty both as a word and as a concept”); ROLAND R. FOULKE, A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (1920) (“The word sovereignty is ambiguous . . . .  We propose to waste
no time in chasing shadows, and will therefore discard the word entirely”).
8See, e.g., Helmut Steinberger, Sovereignty, 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. 397,
398-400 (1987) (discussing Universitas Christiana); HAROLD J. LASKI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
SOVEREIGNTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 2 (1921); BRIAN TIERNEY, ORIGINS OF PAPAL INFALLIBILITY
1 (1972) (discussing J. DE MAISTRE, DU PAPE 27 (Geneva,1966) (first published in 1817)).
9See LASKI, supra note 8, at 12.
10Maritain, supra note 7, at 344.
11JEAN BODIN, DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE Bk. 1, Ch. 8 (1583) (English translation by Richard
Knolles (1606) at p. 84, quoted in Maritain, supra note 7, at 345 n.13).
12BODIN, supra note 11, at Bk. I, Ch. 8.
13THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Part II, Ch. xvii, ¶ [14].
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argued that it is a term so confused that we are better off without it.7  Early western political
thought recognized only one sovereign and did not include the concept of equal “sovereign”
states.  God, through the earthly expression of the Pope, was the ultimate legal authority.8  This
changed, however, when the Respublica Christiana gave way to the Reformation.9
Jean Bodin, the “father of the modern theory of sovereignty,”10 described sovereignty as
“the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citisens and subjects in a
Commonweale.”11  Nonetheless, he continued to maintain that the king remained submissive to
“the law of God and nature.”12  Thomas Hobbes also expressed the idea that states inherited the
notion of sovereignty that existed between the divine king and his subjects.13  For Hobbes, as for
Bodin, the starting point was the internal relationship between the king and his subjects.  Thus,
citizens enter a mutual covenant to confer upon the sovereign “all our power and strength,” and
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
14Id. at Part II, Ch. xvii, ¶ [13].
15Id. at Part II, Ch. xviii, ¶ [8].
16For further elaboration on the proper role of sovereignty in international law generally,
see Ronald A. Brand, Sovereignty: The State, the Individual, and the International Legal System
in the Twenty-First Century, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 279 (2002); Ronald A. Brand,
External Sovereignty and International Law, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1685 (1995).
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“submit their wills, every one to his will and their judgments, to his judgments,” so that “he may
use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common
defence.”14
The sovereign’s role in international relations was a natural extension of this arrangement
for peace and security at home.  The sovereign must:
be judge both of the means of peace and defence, and also of the hindrances and
disturbances of the same, and . . . do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be
done, both before-hand (for preserving of peace and security, by prevention of
discord at home and from abroad) and, when peace and security is lost, for the
recovery of the same. 15
This idea that the sovereign’s role is to provide security through peace and common defense has
important consequences for both internal and external political considerations, and is useful in
understanding the proper role of the state in international relations.16
The concept of sovereignty of states has become a fundamental element in the discussion
of international legal relations.  In this context, the word “sovereignty”continues to be grounded
in the authority of the sovereign.  But that authority deals not only with internal relations between
the governor and the governed, but applies also to relationships with other states.  The role of
private international law affects both of these aspects of sovereignty, requiring consideration of
the rights and authority of other states, and ultimately affecting the law applied to private parties
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art25
17Note, for example, the titles of CHESHIRE AND NORTH’S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
(13th ed., Peter North and James J. Fawcett, eds., 1999) and DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (13th ed., Lawrence Collins ed., 2000).
18Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Substance, 42
VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 932 (2002).
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on behalf of the state through its courts.
III. Sovereignty and Private International Law
A. The general context
Private international law, by its very nature, requires a framework for understanding
relationships among states in the regulation of private party conduct.  This is demonstrated by the
interchangeable use of the terms “conflict of laws” and “private international law.”17  Whether
we are discussing jurisdiction, applicable law, or recognition of judgments, we are dealing with
the way in which different sets of internal legal rules, developed by different sovereign entities,
should be applied to private party relationships in a judicial context.
A simple, and very nationalistic, approach to such matters is to elevate the local sovereign
and its laws over the foreign sovereign and its laws.  Concern for the equality of states, proper
recognition of territorial authority, and the potential for the damaging effect of reciprocal
treatment, however, tend to temper the temptation to move in this direction.  Thus, 
[p]rivate international law . . . is based on principles of territorial sovereignty and equality
among sovereigns. It assumes that each state has the authority to regulate persons and
activities within its borders, and that the laws and actions of one state can have no direct
effect in another.18
The assumption that each state has territorial authority within its borders emanates from concepts
of equality and comity, and results in respect for that authority in the courts of other states,
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
19See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
20The confusion that leads to fears of “giving up sovereignty” were clearly demonstrated
in the debate in the United States Senate over entry into the World Trade Organization in the
mid-1990s, and can be seen in a comparison of the statements of Senators Helms, Thurmond, and
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especially when those courts are faced with events that occurred in other states.  This in turn
leads to the development of rules for determining where a case may be brought, which laws will
apply to resolve the issues raised, and the effect to be given in other states to the resulting
judgment.
The same is true of the relationship between the state and private parties.  Here again, a
simple (and authoritarian) approach would be always to subjugate the will of private parties
concerning their transactions to the will of the state.  Nonetheless, the idea that parties can opt
out of many national legal rules has become a matter of common practice at the beginning of the
twenty-first century.19  Respect for party autonomy in private relationships has become a
cornerstone of modern private international law.
The very notion of private international law connotes certain limits on the exercise of
sovereign authority.  Rules that allow the application of foreign law, or deference to the courts
and judgments of a foreign court, operate to restrict the application of local law and the
assumption of local jurisdiction.  While this may indicate limitations on the exercise of authority,
however, it does not necessarily indicate limitations on sovereignty.  If the proper role of the
sovereign is to provide peace and security for those within its territory, then the jealous retention
of power to apply one’s own laws and to hear all cases is not necessarily synonymous with the
proper exercise of sovereignty.  Nor does the proper recognition of foreign state interests result in
“giving up sovereignty.”20   Moreover, the very existence of rules of private international law
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art25
Byrd discussing Helms' proposed "Sense of the Senate regarding the need to protect the
constitutional role of the Senate," at 140 Cong. Rec. S10,582-591 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1994), with
those of Senator Dole, "Dole Cites Benefits of World Trade Agreement," in a press release of
Dec. 1, 1994. 
For this author, the fundamental issues of this debate are best expressed by the comments
of a friend and scholar of philosophy in the following statements:
[I]n one real meaning of the word, sovereignty is not something an individual can give
up:  individuals give up their rights (which they have by nature) to act exclusively out of
short-term self-interest when they establish a sovereign, but they do it because
cooperation and mutual protection is ultimately in their long-term self-interest.  By the
same reasoning, . . . sovereignty is not something a state can give up to other states: 
particular commonwealths can institute a mutual authority out of long-term self-interest;
they can agree not to exercise some of the rights conferred on them by their own subjects. 
Some of the "relinquishing sovereignty" business is just a conceptual confusion: 
sovereignty is a relationship between governed and governor, not a feature of individual
people or states. 
  Memorandum from Joan Wellman to Ronald Brand (Mar. 8, 1995).
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demonstrates acknowledgment by states of the authority of other states within their own territory. 
The question ultimately is one of proper balance between retention of forum-state regulatory
authority and acknowledgment of the equal authority of other states within their own territory.  In
other words, it is a question of the proper exercise of sovereignty, not a question of allocations of
sovereignty.  A state’s interest in applying its own law in its own courts must always be tempered
by its interest in having its law applied in the courts of other states and its interest in having other
states defer to it when appropriate on matters of jurisdiction.  Those interests are not advanced by
jealous protectionist rules.
B. The effect of legal harmonization and cooperation on private international
law
The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed a trend toward cooperation in the
development of both private law and private international law; a trend that has continued into the
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
21This process is perhaps most evident in the multilateral context in the work of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (UNIDROIT).
22United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/18, Annex I, English version reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 6264 (1987) and in 19 I.L.M.
668 (1980) [hereinafter “Sales Convention” or “CISG”].
23Id art. 1.
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twenty-first century.21  One result of this trend has been a reduction in the need for rules of
private international law.  When a treaty creates substantive rules of private law applicable across
borders, the result should be that courts will apply those rules and avoid the need to refer to rules
of private international law to determine which national law applies.  Such rules reduce the
conflict in the conflict of laws analysis.
This is true, for example, with the rules applicable to international contracts for the sale
of goods found in the U.N. Sales Convention.22  While it is possible that in some cases the
existence of the Sales Convention may require that a court determine whether the law of the
seller’s state, the buyer’s state, or the Sales Convention is the applicable law, that determination
itself will most often be a matter of the substantive law of the Sales Convention, and not
something for which local rules of private international law will govern.23  Thus, even in such
cases, the existence of a treaty normally will prevent the application of local rules of private
international law.  The more such treaties we have, the less the role for national rules of private
international law.
This is also true of treaties that create new jurisdictional rules.  The most significant
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art25
24New York Convention, supra note 2.
25
“Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties
undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise
between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.”  Id. art. 2(1).
26Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).  See
also Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc decision
withdrawing earlier decision at 107 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1997)), in which the 9th Circuit upheld
the choice of law and choice of forum clauses in the standard Lloyd’s “Name” contract—which
provides for English law to be applied in English courts to any dispute arising out of
membership—against allegations that it violated the anti-waiver provisions of the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
27Brussels I Regulation, supra note 1.
28Rome Convention, supra note 4.
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example in this regard has been the New York Arbitration Convention.24  In the United States,
for example, Article 2(1) of the Convention25 has been interpreted to require that even issues of
antitrust law, generally considered to have important regulatory significance, must be submitted
to arbitration in a foreign country before foreign arbitrators, if the parties have agreed to such
arbitration of their disputes.26  Thus, the rule for determining forum jurisdiction in such a case is
found in a treaty rather than in the local rules of private international law, and courts are
prevented from taking jurisdiction in violation of those rules.
In Europe, the determination of both jurisdiction and choice of law have been relegated to
rules found in treaties and in the internal legislation of the European Community.  Thus, the
Brussels I Regulation now provides a comprehensive set of rules for jurisdiction in cases
involving defendants domiciled in Member States of the European Union,27 and the Rome
Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations28 provides a comprehensive set of
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
29Uniform Commercial Code § 1-105:
Territorial Application of the Act; Parties’ Power to Choose Applicable Law
(1)  Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a
reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may
agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern
their rights and duties.  Failing such agreement this Act applies to transactions
bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
Note, however, that states enacting the 2001 revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code have
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rules for determining applicable law in contract cases in the courts of Member States.  In each
case, national rules of private international law are replaced by multilateral or regional legal
instruments.  While these instruments then become the source of much discussion in leading
treatises on private international law, they nonetheless represent the replacement of national rules
of private international law with uniform regional sources of the law applied to determine
jurisdiction and choice of law.
C. Expanded recognition of party autonomy
The other trend affecting private international law has been increased recognition of party
autonomy in selecting both the rules governing a transaction and the forum in which disputes
arising out of that transaction are to be decided.  This is demonstrated in judicial decisions, state
and national legislation, treaties, and internal European Community legislation.
In the United States, uniform state law provides respect for private party selection of
governing law.  For example, the Uniform Commercial Code rule in effect in most states allows
parties to choose the law applicable to their relationship whenever their “transaction bears a
reasonable relation to” the state or nation whose law is chosen.29  Similar respect for party
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art25
tended to stay with the language of the old § 1-105, rather than adopt the new § 1-301(c) that
would extend party autonomy even further by upholding party choice of law “whether or not the
transaction bears a relation to the State or country designated.”  U.C.C. § 1-301(c)(2) (2001
revisions).
30Supra note 4.
31Id. art. 3.
32M/S Bremen and Unterweser Reederei, GmbH v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972).
33Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874).  See also Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The
Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-301 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959)
(“agreements in advance of controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are
contrary to public policy and will not be enforced.”).
34Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.
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autonomy in the choice of applicable law is found in Europe in the Rome Convention,30 Article 3
of which provides respect for the law chosen by the parties to a contract, subject only to certain
mandatory rules of national law.31
On choice of forum issues, the United States has moved forward through judicial
decisions, while Europe has done so through conventions and Community legislation.  In The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co,32 the U.S. Supreme Court signaled the end of parochial views
regarding choice of forum.  Earlier decisions of the Court had stated that “agreements in advance
to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.”33  In Bremen, the
court upheld the contractual choice of a London court in a dispute between German and
American parties, emphasizing that “[t]he expansion of American business and industry will
hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that
all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.”34  Thus, the Court recognized
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
35Id. at 13.  When the same dispute was litigated concurrently in the English courts, the
English Court of Appeal sustained jurisdiction there under the choice of forum clause despite the
fact that the transaction had no connection with England, noting that, “in the absence of strong
reason to the contract,” the discretion of the English court “will be exercised in favour of holding
parties to their bargain.”  Unterweser Reederi GmbH v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., [1968] 2 Lloyd’s
L. Rep. 158, 163 (C.A.).
36Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10.
37Supra note 1.
38Id. art. 23:
1.  If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Member State, have agreed that a
court or the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which
have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that
court or those courts shall have jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless
the parties have agreed otherwise. Such an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall be
either:
  (a)  in writing or evidenced in writing; or
  (b)  in a form which accords with practices which the parties have established between
themselves; or
  (c)  in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of which
the parties are or ought to have been aware and which in such trade or commerce is
widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in
the particular trade or commerce concerned.
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that parties to an international transaction often have good reason to provide for a neutral forum
for the resolution of disputes.35  The statement that forum selection clauses “are prima facie valid
and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable
under the circumstances,”36 has become the foundation for subsequent common law respect for
party choice of forum in the United States.
In Europe, the Brussels Convention, and now the Brussels I Regulation,37 provide clear
deference to party choice of a judicial forum for dispute settlement.  Article 23(1) of the
Regulation provides that a Member State court selected by the parties “shall have jurisdiction” if
one of the parties is domiciled in a Member State.38  While this rule is subject to exclusive rules
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art25
39Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Exclusive Choice of
Court Agreements, available at: http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php.
40See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
41See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.
J. INT’L L. 46 (1992) (“Increasingly, governments recognize that their legitimacy depends on
meeting a normative expectation of the community of states.  This recognition has led to the
emergence of a community expectation:  that those who seek the validation of their
empowerment patently govern with the consent of the governed.  Democracy, thus, is on the way
to becoming a global entitlement, one that increasingly will be promoted and protected by
collective international processes.”).
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of jurisdiction contained in Article 22, and certain protective rules in Articles 8 through 21 (for
insurance, consumer, and employment cases), it nonetheless prevails over the general jurisdiction
rule of Article 2 and the special jurisdiction rules of Articles 5 through 7.
This respect for party autonomy will be enhanced further if the Convention on Exclusive
Choice of Court Agreements concluded in June 2005 by the Hague Conference on Private
International Law becomes a successful and functioning treaty.39  That Convention will provide
respect for party choice of litigation in the same way that the New York Convention provides
respect for party choice of arbitration.40
IV. The New World of Sovereign Authority and its Effect on Private International Law
The final decades of the twentieth century witnessed substantial movement toward market
economic systems and democratic governments.  Thus, the sovereign "prince" gave way to the
sovereign "we," albeit in a representative fashion.  Some have argued that the trend toward
democratization represents a normative change sufficient to elevate democracy to a right
governed by international law.41  While this may yet be only de lege ferenda at best, the mere
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suggestion of its existence is significant.  An international law right to democratic government
could carry with it significant subsidiarization of authority in the individual, including in the
choice of rules applicable to private transactions.  It would, of course, be the individual, not the
state, that could claim the right to a democratic form of government.
This potential evolution of democracy as an international norm has implications both for
any discussion of sovereignty and for the development of rules of private international law.  Like
the development of private international law, it is accompanied by both internationalization and
individualization of authority for private conduct.  Each of these directions taken in the
channeling of authority could be seen as reducing the authority of the state.  If handled properly,
however, allocations in both directions represent the proper exercise of sovereign function in a
society that is becoming progressively more global in its relationships and more democratic in its
governing norms.
The combination of globalization of sources of law and individualization of responsibility
for rules governing private relationships can be seen as a logical evolution in the development of
social contract theory that bases its legitimacy on the relationship of the governed to the governor
in a manner originally described under the rubric of sovereignty.  If we are engaged in such an
evolutionary process, then the proper allocation of authority within the new structure of
relationships should lead to greater predictability in private commercial relationships, and thus to
fewer economic tensions that might rise to more serious tensions at governmental levels.  Thus,
this proper allocation of authority, both to global players (whether intergovernmental, non-
governmental, or otherwise) and to private parties in their own relationships, does not represent a
diminution of sovereignty of the state, but rather the proper exercise of sovereign authority in a
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modern world.  If it also represents a system in which the need for national rules of private
international law is diminished, that in itself should be neither a concern nor a problem.
V. Sovereignty, Party Autonomy, and Private International Law in the European
Court of Justice
Three recent decisions of the European Court of Justice–each interpreting the Brussels
Convention–offer an opportunity to apply some of the concepts developed above.  In each case,
the Court addresses issues of parallel litigation and the hierarchy of rules otherwise applicable
within and without the European Union.
In one sense, the European Community demonstrates the multilateralization of private
international law rules, with its conventions and regulations providing rules that remove the need
for reference to national rules of private international law for purposes of determining the
applicable law or the proper jurisdiction of Member State courts.  This evolution is most evident
in the effect over the past few years of the competence transferred to the Community institutions
under Article 65 of the European Community Treaty.42  With the Treaty of Amsterdam, the
Community absorbed competence for matters that had been left to treaties among Member States
in the original Treaty of Rome.  While Article 220 of the Treaty creating the European Economic
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Community acknowledged the need for free movement of judgments,43 it did so by declaring that
the Member States should “enter into [further] negotiations with each other with a view to
securing for the benefit of their nationals . . .  the simplification of formalities governing the
reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration
awards.”44  The 1968 Brussels Convention was negotiated based on this authority.45
The Amsterdam Treaty, signed on October 2, 1997,46 gave new competence to the
Community Institutions for the creation of internal law.  Article 61 of the amended Treaty
provides that “the Council shall adopt . . . measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil
matters as provided for in Article 65.”47  Article 65 then outlines that authority to include
measures “insofar as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market” for “improving
and simplifying” service of documents, the taking of evidence, and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments; “promoting the compatibility” of rules on the conflict of laws and
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jurisdiction; and “eliminating obstacles” by “promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil
procedure.”48  The Regulations promulgated under this authority include the Brussels I
Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters.49  A regulation to replace the Rome Convention on the law applicable to
contractual obligations is also in the works.50  Thus, the set of rules determining both jurisdiction
and applicable law in a significant number of cases within Europe will soon be governed, not by
national rules of private international law, but rather by internal Community legislation.  This
will make the role of all Community institutions more important to those concerned with private
international law issues–with the role of the European Court of Justice as final interpreter of the
rules to have special significance.
Thus it is that existing decisions of the European Court of Justice, interpreting both the
new Regulations and their predecessor conventions, take on particular importance.  In this light,
the Court’s decisions in the 2003 Gasser case,51 the 2004 Turner case,52 and the 2005 Owusu
case,53 raise important questions about private international law, sovereignty, and party autonomy
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in the European Union.  Each of these cases came to the Court on reference for a preliminary
ruling on the internpretation of the Brussels Convention.
The Gasser case involved the application of articles 17 and 21 of the Brussels
Convention.  When a transaction between an Austrian seller and an Italian buyer went bad, the
Italian company was the first to bring suit, in an Italian court.  The Austrian company then
brought suit in Austria for payment on outstanding invoices.  Those invoices contained clauses
calling for disputes to be brought only in Austrian courts.  If those clauses were part of the
agreement between the parties, then Article 17 of the Brussels Convention provideed for
exclusive jurisdiction in Austrian courts.  The Italian party argued, however, that the governing
provision was Article 21, which contains the lis pendens rule requiring deference to the court
first seised.  If the Austrian party was correct in its assertions, there was a valid choice of court
clause establishing jurisdiction in Austria; even if such a clause were not valid, jurisdiction over
the Austrian seller existed only in Austria under Article 2 (domicile of the defendant) or Article
5(1) (place of performance of the contract); and the Italian action was brought only to frustrate
proper adjudication in a system that would take years simply to decide the issue of jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, the European Court of Justice ruled that the lis pendens rule of Article 21 trumps
the choice of court rule of Article 17, and that the Austrian case must be dismissed in favor of
litigation in Italy.
Both Turner and Owusu involved litigation in the United Kingdom, focusing attention on 
differences between common law and civil law legal traditions.  In Turner, a U.K. domicilary
who had worked in both London and Madrid for a group of companies, brought an employment
claim before the Employment Tribunal in London on the grounds that the employer had
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improperly attempted to implicate him in illegal conduct.  He ultimately received an award of
damages.  After the employement action was first brought in London, however, the employer
sued the employee in the court of first instance in Madrid.  The employee then brought an action
in the High Court of Justice in England and Wales for an order enjoining the employer from
pursuing the action in Spain.  The employee prevailed in the U.K. Court of Appeal, and an
injunction was issued.  On appeal to the House of Lords, the matter was referred to the European
Court of Justice on the question “whether the Convention precludes the grant of an injunction by
which a court of a Contracting State  prohibits a party to proceedings pending before it from
commencing or continuing legal proceedings before a court in another Contracting State even
where that party is acting in bad faith in order to frustrate the existing proceedings.”54  Finding
that “the  Convention is necessarily based on the trust which the Contracting States accord to one
another's legal systems and judicial institutions;”55 that “otherwise than in a small number of
exceptional cases . . . the Convention does not permit the jurisdiction of a court to be reviewed
by a court in another Contracting State;”56 and that “a prohibition imposed by a court, backed by
a penalty, restraining a party from commencing or continuing proceedings before a foreign court
undermines the latter court's jurisdiction to determine the dispute;”57 the Court held that the anti-
suit injunction was prohibited by the Brussels Convention “even where that party is acting in bad
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faith with a view to frustrating the existing proceedings.”58
The Owusu decision highlights both the contrast between common law and civil law
systems in issues of parallel litigation and alternative forums and the extent to which the
European Court of Justice has reached in order to impose a rigid interpretation of jurisdictional
principles under the Brussels Convention (and Regulation) regime.  Mr. Owusu, a British
national domiciled in the United Kingdom, was injured while vacationing in Jamaica.  He
brought suit in the United Kingdom, naming as defendants an individual domiciled in the United
Kingdom from whom he had rented the vacation home and several Jamaican companies
allegedly responsible for not giving notice of the hazardous conditions that led to Mr. Owusu’s
swimming accident.  There was no party from another Brussels Convention State, and the only
defendant from within the European Community was from the same State as was the plaintiff. 
Thus, the case was international only because there were parties from outside the Community.  
The Owusu defendants sought to have the case dismissed on the grounds of forum non
conveniens, on the argument that Jamaica was the more appropriate forum.59  The matter was
submitted to the European Court of Justice by the Court of Appeal for a ruling on whether the
Brussels Convention prohibited relief on the forum non conveniens motion when the alternative
forum was Jamaica (a non-Contracting State for Brussels Convention purposes).  The Court
ultimately held that the Brussels Convention “precludes a court of a Contracting State from
declining the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 2 of that convention on the ground that a
court of a non-Contracting State would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action
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even if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State is in issue or the proceedings have no
connecting factors to any other Contracting State.”60
For an observer from a common law system outside of Europe the Owusu judgment is
remarkable on at least four counts.  They are:
1) The Court began its analysis with Article 2 of the Brussels Regulation (the
provision containing the rule of general jurisdiction in the courts of the
defendant’s state of domicile), stressing the “international nature” of the case even
when there was not a party from another Contracting State.  In doing so, the Court
explicitly noted that this was inconsistent with the position taken in the Jenard
Report that was created contemporaneous with the drafting of the Brussels
Convention and usually considered to be authoritative on questions of
interpretation.61
2) In determining that Article 2 applied, the Court found that the doctrine of forum
non conveniens was incompatible with the Brussels Convention because the
Convention rules protect the defendant by providing predictability of location of
potential suit.62  But the Court used this argument to defeat the application of the
defendant to have the case tried elsewhere.  Thus, it used a protection of the
defendant argument to give the case to the plaintiff; a rather ironic result.
3) By emphasizing the need for uniform application of the Brussels Convention, the
Court determined that since the majority of European Community Member States
do not recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the Convention should be
interpreted to prohibit its application even in cases not involving parties from two
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Member States.63  Such a “majority wins” approach to treaty interpretation would
seem clearly inappropriate in the interpretation of other multilateral private law
conventions such as the U.N. Sales Convention.  While uniform interpretation is
important, there seems to be no rule of international law outside the European
Union that would require that uniformity be achieved by overriding the law of
minority contracting states to a convention, and simply imposing the majority rule
in situations where that result is not otherwise explicit in the convention’s terms.
4) The court summarily dismissed the argument that a judgment in the main action in
the United Kingdom was likely not to be enforceable against the Jamaican
defendants in Jamaica, stating only that such an argument was “not such as to call
into question the mandatory nature of the fundamental rule of jurisdiction
contained in Article 2 of the Brussels Convention.”64  This seems to be at odds
with the purpose of the Brussels Convention to create judgments from Member
State courts that are subject to recognition and enforcement in the courts of other
states (even though the application of the Brussels Convention in this regard is
limited to recognition and enforcement in other Member States).  When the same
convention is applied because a case is “internationalized” through the existence
of defendants from a non-Member State, but such internationalization then results
in the application of rules that lead to judgments not likely to be enforceable in the
state in which the defendant is located, it is odd to hear the court argue that this is
consistent with the policies of the Convention.
The result of the Court’s analysis, based largely on the need for “the predictability of the rules of
jurisdiction laid down by the Brussels Convention,”65 is a rigid adherence to the civil law
preference for a doctrine of lis pendens over the common law preference for a doctrine of forum
non conveniens.  While the majority of the Judges on the Court may believe that lis pendens is
the better approach to parallel litigation and alternative forums–and it clearly is the rule
applicable inside the Brussels Convention and Regulation system–this application of that
preference to a common law adjudication in a system that recognizes the doctrine of forum non
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conveniens, when no other Community Member State is involved, seems to be a bit of a stretch.
The Owusu result is quite consistent, however, with the approach in Gasser that elevates
lis pendens over the parties’ choice of court and thus creates potential for improper defensive
litigation.  Both create a preference for a rush to the courthouse in order to pre-empt litigation in
the natural forum and to allow a party other than the natural plaintiff to gain an advantage by
bringing the case in a defensive fashion.  This is at the core of the difference between civil law
and common law traditions on parallel litigation.  The civil law race to the court house arguably
has the benefit of predictability, but it sacrafices the opportunity for reasoned efforts to resolve
disputes before the natural escalation of tensions brought about by formal litigation.  It also
prevents any judicial discretion designed to place the case in the most appropriate forum.  It
necessarily assumes that the first forum seised will always be the most appropriate forum.
The problems with this aspect of the Court’s Brussels Convention jurisprudence is
revealed in the April 2005 decision of the London Commercial Court in J.P. Morgan v.
Primacom.66  JP Morgan was agent for a number of banks under a secured facility agreement on
loans to Primacom.  The agreements involved included a clause selecting English law as the
governing law, and another providing for exclusive jurisdiction for any disputes in the courts of
England.67  When Primacom became delinquent on its loan payments, it initiated proceedings in
Germany alleging that provisions of the loan documents violated German public policy.  JP
Morgan brought actions in England to enjoin Primacom from disposing of assets and for
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declarations of specific performance rights under the secured facility agreement.  
Mr. Justice Cooke determined that 
As a matter of English Law it is clear that both these proceedings were commenced in
breach of the exclusive jurisdiction clause and the evidence suggests that this was done
with the primary intention of frustrating any possible attempt by JP Morgan and the SSLs
to seek appropriate relief in the English Courts in accordance with that jurisdiction clause. 
 . . . .  It is clear that delay is advantageous to Primacom and this appears to be one of its
objectives.68
Nonetheless, he considered himself bound by the terms of Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation
and the European Court of Justice decision in Gasser to stay the declaratory proceedings pending
decision by the German court.69  He did, however, determine that the injunction proceedings
could continue in order to protect the interests of JP Morgan,70 subject to the jurisdictional
decision in the German courts.71
The Primacom case demonstrates problems with allocation of private international law
authority at both the Community and Member State levels.  At the Community level, it shows
that the Gasser judgment actually promotes inappropriate parallel litigation by encouraging
negative declaratory judgment actions intended to frustrate litigation in the forum appropriately
chosen by the parties.  At the Member State level, it opens the door to national laws that can be
used to frustrate general rules favoring party autonomy and predictable choice of forum.72  Both
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results are inconsistent with the positive general trends promoting multilateral uniformity and
party autonomy.
This approach taken by the European Court of Justice in its trilogy of cases also elevates a
quest for efficiency over a quest for equity.  Hence the stated focus on predictability in the Owusu
decision.73  But the Gasser case demonstrates–and Primacom emphasizes–that such rigid
analysis of the Brussels Convention rules will not always be efficient.  If the argument of the
Austrian party in Gasser was correct, then the preference for the first-seised Italian case will only
delay the natural course of litigation in the court chosen by the parties, which is the court to
which the Italian court ultimately would have to send the case under the Brussels Convention. 
The same is true in Owusu if the argument of the defendants was correct and the English
judgment would not be enforceable in Jamaica, thus requiring further litigation in Jamaica on the
same claims after the English litigation is complete.  
While the argument for predictability and efficiency has its merits, it also has its
limitations, and those limitations seem all too evident in this line of cases in the European Court
of Justice.  They represent a clear effort to fix rigid rules that will not always be equitable in their
application, thus removing the ability of parties and courts to move toward more appropriate
legal results.  In its application of the Brussels Convention, the Court justifies its decisions as
enhancing predictability.  But predictability in the application of sovereign rules and
predictability in the conduct of private transactional relationships are two different matters.  It is
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thus necessary to consider which of these types of predictability should be our goal.74
As noted earlier in this article, predictability in the application of legal rules can easily be
achieved by simple rules that are neither fair in their application nor respectful of the interests of
other states.75  The evolution of private international law toward multilateral cooperation and
unification, and toward greater respect for party autonomy, clearly demonstrates that in the
twenty-first century states have acknowledged the inappropriateness of such an approach to
issues of jurisdiction, applicable law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.  The recent
approach of the European Court of Justice to the interpretation of the Brussels Convention
clearly does not fit with this evolutionary trend.
The Court’s interpretation of the Brussels Convention (and by extension the Brussels I
Regulation) may provide predictability in the application of the jurisdictional rules of the
Convention, but the very cases in which these rules are applied demonstrate that such an
interpretation serves to frustrate the goal of predictability in private party relationships.  The role
of the state in such matters (consistent with recent trends in private international law), should be
to provide private parties with greater predictability in their relationships, not to create simplicity
of analysis for courts when that analysis leads to inequitable results.  Decisions that encourage
defensive use of litigation and a rush to the court house operate to frustrate both the proper
development of private relationships and a positive role for the judicial system in the resolution
of private disputes.
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VI. Conclusion
Private international law at the beginning of the twentieth century demonstrates two
important trends:  (1) a trend toward greater multilateral cooperation and unification in private
law and private international law matters, and (2) a trend toward increased respect for party
autonomy in determining the rules applicable to private relationships.  These trends represent a
rejection of simple rules of private international law that may be predictable in statement but
inequitable in their application.  This is a positive trend that is wholly consistent with proper
notions of sovereignty in which the state may delegate authority for private commercial
relationships in a manner that results in enhanced security and predictability in those
relationships.
The fact that the European Court of Justice applies Community conventions and
regulations seems at first glance to be consistent with the trend toward multilateralism in private
international law.  But if the result is simply to make the rules on a different level, but then apply
them in a fashion that fails adequately to consider the interests of private parties and of states
outside the Brussels system, then the process represents the elevation to a new level of the
application of the type of private international law analysis that states otherwise have rejected. 
Modern private international law is in the process of leaving behind such bygone concepts of
sovereignty.  The mere fact that the sovereign may now be the European Union rather than one of
its Member States does not justify this approach.
Recent cases of the European Court of Justice interpreting the Brussels Convention
demonstrate a federalization of Community law, with the Court clearly trying to unify private
international law principles within the Community structure.  It is important, however, that this
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maturation of a multilateral system into a central regime not bring with it the absolutist approach
to private international law rules that has otherwise been rejected in efforts to enhance
multilateral cooperation and elevate party autonomy.  An absolutist rule of private international
law may provide the ultimate in judicial predictability without providing either a good rule or
predictability in private relationships.  By focusing on the predictability of the application of
rules, without concurrently recognizing the need for those rules to generate predictability in
private party relationships, the European Court of Justice appears to be going in a direction that
can only create anew the types of problems many had thought were being put behind us in the
evolution of private international law. 
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